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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School District No. 40-1,
U.S. -, 53 U.S.L.W. 4063 (January 9, 1985).

-

In Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School DistrictNo. 40-1, the
U.S. Supreme Court scrutinized the validity of a South Dakota statute
which regulated the spending of federal funds which counties receive in
lieu of property taxes. Under the Payment in Lieu of Taxes Act, the
federal government is required to make annual payments to counties and
certain other local units of government in which "entitlement lands" are
located. Entitlement lands include wilderness areas, national parks, and
lands administered by the Bureau of Land Management. The payments
are made to compensate the local governments for the revenues lost
because of the tax-exempt federal lands located within their borders. The
act provides that the counties "may use the payment for any governmental
purpose."
The challenged South Dakota statute required the county governments
to distribute the payments received from the federal government in the
same way in which they distribute general tax revenues. The effect of
this statute was that the appellant Lawrence County was required to
allocate sixty percent of its federal revenues to the school districts in the
county. When the county refused to distribute the federal funds according
to the statutory plan, the Lead-Deadwood School District sought a writ
of mandamus in state court to compel the county to do so. A local court
granted the writ, and the South Dakota Supreme Court upheld the decision.
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the South
Dakota statute was invalid under the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution. The Court found that the statute was inconsistent
with the purposes and objectives of the federal act. Congress intended
for the local units of government to have wide discretion in spending the
in-lieu-of-tax money. The act was intended not only to compensate for
the loss of potential tax revenues, but to provide for the unique expenses
caused by the presence of the federal entitlement lands as well.

Chemical ManufacturersAssociation v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., _ U.S. -, 53 U.S.L.W. 4193 (February 27, 1985).
The Clean Water Act places restrictions on firms or individuals who
discharge pollutants into waterways. The act charges the Environmental
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Protection Agency (EPA) with promulgating regulations and standards
necessary to implement it. The EPA sets uniform discharge limitations,
based on specific statutory factors such as type of industrial process, or
type of pollutant. The EPA also establishes a procedure that allows a
specific plant or industry to obtain a variance where the factors relating
to the plant or industry are fundamentally different from the factors used
to set the applicable uniform limitations.
The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) brought suit to enjoin
this variance procedure as it applies to toxic pollutants. The NRDC argued
that the procedure violates the statutory provision prohibiting the EPA
administrator from modifying any requirement for toxic pollutant discharge limitations. The EPA countered that the variance was not a modification within the meaning of the act. but involved only fine-tuning of
the limitations to reflect the factors relevant to specific industries. EPA
claimed the variances were necessary because it could not effectively set
uniform standards which apply to all types of industry and pollutants
without incurring enormous expense.
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a five-to-four decision, upheld the variance
procedure. The Court held that the EPA's interpretation of the statutory
provision is entitled to deference because it is the view of the agency
charged with administering the statute. The Court found that the EPA's
interpretation was "sufficiently rational" to preclude the Court from substituting its judgment for that of the agency. Moreover, the Court found
that the variance procedure was a sensible procedure not inconsistent with
the language, goals, or operation of the act.

United States v. Louisiana, - U.S. -, 53 U.S.L.W. 4186 (February
26, 1985).
In United States v. Louisiana, the U.S. Supreme Court determined
whether the land underlying the Mississippi Sound belongs to the states
of Alabama and Missippi, or to the federal government. The issue arose
out of a boundary dispute between the two states. Under the Submerged
Lands Act, a state is entitled to ownership in the land and minerals beneath
the navigable waters within its borders. The act also recognizes a seaward
boundary for a distance of three miles from the coastline of each coastal
state.
The Mississippi Sound is a body of water south of the states of Mississippi and Alabama, and north of a line of barrier islands in the Gulf
of Mexico. The Sound is about eighty miles long and ten miles wide. A
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special master appointed in the case found that the Sound belongs to the
states. He found that, because the Sound is inland waters within the
meaning of the Submerged Lands Act, the coastal boundary must be
measured from the south end of the barrier islands rather than from the
mainland.
The Supreme Court upheld the special master's determination, reasoning that the Sound is inland waters by virtue of being a "historic bay."
The Court defined "historic bay" as a bay over which a coastal nation
has traditionally asserted and maintained dominion with the acquiescence
of foreign nations. It found that the United States had exercised sovereignty over the Mississippi Sound as inland waters since the time of the
Louisiana Purchase, without protest by foreign nations.

County of Oneida, New York v. Oneida Indian Nation of New York
State, - U.S. -, 53 U.S.L.W. 4225 (March 4, 1985).
This case arose out of a 1970 lawsuit by the Oneida Tribe against the
counties of Oneida and Madison, New York. The tribe sought to have a
1795 conveyance of 100,000 acres of land to the state of New York
declared invalid. It also sought damages for the fair rental value of the
land. The counties admitted that the conveyance was in violation of the
Trade and Intecourse Act of 1793, but argued that the tribe had no statutory
or common law cause of action against them. The counties also filed a
third-party complaint against the state of New York for indemnity.
The United States District Court for the Northern District of New York
held a trifurcated trial of the issues in the case. The court held that the
counties were liable to the tribe for wrongful possession of the land. It
assessed damages against the counties in the amount of $16,694 for the
fair rental value of the property over the two-year period specified in the
complaint. In the third phase, the court held that the state of New York
must indemnify the counties for the damages owed to the Oneidas. The
counties and the state appealed, and the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
affirmed.
The United States Supreme Court held that the Oneidas had a common
law right to sue for unlawful possession and upheld the award of damages.
The Court reasoned that its previous decisions had implicitly recognized
in the Indians a federal common law right to enforce their aboriginal land
rights. It rejected the petitioners' argument that the Nonintercourse Act
of 1793 pre-empted this common law right. The Court noted that the
Nonintercourse Act failed to establish a comprehensive remedial plan for
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dealing with Indian property rights. The Court similarly held that the
transfer of the land was not ratified by federally approved treaties in 1798
and 1802 in which the tribe ceded additional lands to the state of New
York. Any attempt to extinguish title to Indian lands must be "plain and
unambiguous."
The Court also held that there is no federal statute of limitations governing the common law action to enforce the Indians' property rights.
The Court refused to follow the general rule and apply an analogous
statute of limitations period. It found that to do so would be inconsistent
with federal policy. While the Court noted that one would have thought
that such claims would have been barred more than a century-and-a-half
ago, it could find no applicable statutory limitation or other relevant legal
basis for denying the Oneidas' right to bring the claim.
Finally, the Court reversed the lower courts' decision on indemnity. It
held that the federal courts have no jurisdiction over the state of New
York on a claim of indemnity to its counties. Such a claim raised an issue
of state law. There is no indication that the state of New York waived its
immunity to suit in federal suit on this question.

